Sector Model
|
XLI
|
1.86%
|
|
Large Portfolio
|
Date
|
Return
|
Days
|
BBRY
|
7/16/2012
|
105.66%
|
250
|
SEAC
|
9/25/2012
|
46.02%
|
179
|
CAJ
|
9/25/2012
|
8.17%
|
179
|
CFI
|
10/31/2012
|
33.73%
|
143
|
RE
|
11/26/2012
|
25.34%
|
117
|
BOKF
|
2/4/2013
|
11.27%
|
47
|
SWM
|
2/12/2013
|
7.15%
|
39
|
GMCR
|
2/19/2013
|
24.87%
|
32
|
OKE
|
2/25/2013
|
-2.51%
|
26
|
CASH
|
3/14/2013
|
0.00%
|
9
|
S&P
|
Annualized
|
8.40%
|
|
Sector Model
|
Annualized
|
25.73%
|
|
Large Portfolio
|
Annualized
|
34.70%
|
Replacing the CASH position with TA.TO (TransAlta Corp.) in
the POWER industry.
When I sold TTM last week I was up just shy of 4%. It dropped 10% this past week, so CASH didn’t
do so bad.
The technical configuration of the market has improved, with
the model showing a 70% net long recommendation.
BBRY took another hit.
Two steps forward, one step back.
What a crazy ride this one has been so far.
Okay, back to Buffett (and the subject of this post): “Be[ating]
Buffett”:
FIRST, WHAT WE CANNOT DO…
Some folks had questions about how Buffett avoids dividend
taxes, so I’ll have to quote his explanation from his book of Essays.
That link is to the 2013 edition. I’ll be quoting from the 2001 edition, page
269:
“There’s a powerful financial
reason behind Berkshire’s preference [to acquire 100% of a business rather than
a small fraction], and that has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshire’s owning 80% or
more of a business far more profitable for us, proportionally, than our owning
a smaller share. When a company we own
all of earns $1 million after tax, the entire amount inures to our
benefit. If the $1 million is upstreamed
to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the dividend.
And, if the earnings are retained and we were to sell the subsidiary –
not likely at Berkshire! – for $1 million more than we paid for it, we would
own no capital gains tax. That’s because
our ‘tax cost’ upon sale would include both what we paid for the business and
all earnings it subsequently retained.
“Contrast that
situation to what happens when we own an investment in a marketable
security. There, if we own a 10% stake
in a business earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share of earnings
is subject to additional state and federal taxes of (1) about $140,000 if it is
distributed to us (our tax rate on most dividends is 14%); or (2) no less than
$350,000 if the $1 million is retained and subsequently captured by us in the
form of a capital gain (on which our tax rate is usually about 35%, though it
sometimes approaches 40%). We may defer
paying the $350,000 by not immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we
must pay the tax. In effect, the
government is our ‘partner’ twice when we own part of a business through a
stock investment, but only once when we own at least 80%.”
I cannot stress enough how important it is to read the
entire book cover to cover – twice. It
gives an entirely new light on the balderdash of “please tax me more” he keeps
shouting for the news cameras.
Imagine you were playing a game, where your back is to the
sun and it cannot affect you – but it can blind your competition. The sun, which does nothing DIRECTLY to you,
still works in your favor by suppressing the competition.
Warren Buffett has his back to the blinding rays of the tax
man. And those rays are aimed straight
at us. It is entirely in his interest to
have that light ramped up as bright as possible.
Warren Buffett should be read, studied, and emulated. He should not be dismissed, and he should not
be worshipped.
He should not be “whale watched” either. Whale watching is that bad habit of buying
stocks just because some successful guy owns them. You’ll just pump up his stocks without
necessarily doing anything for yourself.
So, let’s take a look at higher taxes to see how they HELP
Warren Buffett:
1) They suppress his competition
(pretty much anyone who is not big enough to buy entire companies as he
describes above).
2) They suppress volatility. Volatility is exacerbated by the short term
flipping of stocks. If short term
traders have a 43.8% hit on capital gains, they will VERY QUICKLY lose their
firepower, and will have a diminishing effect on the market.
3) They suppress momentum trading
(typically short term and pro-volatility as well).
So, what does that leave?
It leaves long term value investing with a greater
competitive edge than it used to have.
Therefore, taxes HELP Warren Buffett.
And this leads me to the next part of this post:
WHAT WE CAN DO
We can observe Buffett’s so-called fourth law of motion,
which I’ve paraphrased to “the more you trade, the less you have.”
We have to consider the effect of taxes as obsessively and
as skillfully as Warren Buffett. We have
to IGNORE what he says in the news about taxes not being an issue, and instead
read his essays to see just how important tax avoidance is to successful
investing.
We have to look for long term value and short term
cheapness.
We have to think in terms of years, and not weeks or months.
We have to get a sense of what a company is worth, and see
investment as owning a piece of a COMPANY instead of owning a piece of
PAPER. We aren’t buying a “stock”; we
are buying as much of a “company” as is reasonable for our own net worth.
In other words, the first step in “Beating Buffett” is
learning how to “Be Buffett.”
The greatest lesson I ever learned about investing came from
my grandfather. Ever since 1996, my
grandfather has beaten the pants off of the market.
What did he do?
Nothing.
And I mean, ABSOLUTELY nothing.
My grandfather passed away in 1996. I’d give anything for another game of Uno
with him.
I can’t play Uno with him, but I can let him hold my hand
when I invest.
When he bought companies, he bought companies that would
still be around when he was gone, and year after year my grandmother was “advised”
to flip her stocks, but she refused, and let my grandfather’s long term stock
picking keep her steady. She even had to
sign wavers because her “advisors” didn’t want to be responsible for holding
companies for so long! Years run into
decades, but some companies and industries are set to outlast even the youngest
of us.
Invest as if you won’t be around to “flip” the stock if the
company or industry turns sour.
It takes homework and fundamental thinking.
In short, it takes a different perspective. A simple switch, but not an easy one.
The homework of learning fundamentals is not as complex as
the plethora of technical tricks out there.
The key is that it takes more time BEFORE you buy a stock than technical
tricks do. But it takes less time AFTER
you buy the stock, because you aren’t obsessing over every tick of the price 18
times a day.
Simple – but not easy: because people are not geared to work
BEFORE they get something. We’d rather
buy something on credit than save for it.
Another switch is to focus on the value of the company instead of the price of a stock. If the
price is plummeting, but the long term value of the company is not greatly
affected, the stock has gone on sale.
You may buy it and watch the price plummet ANOTHER 50%. But if you look at the value of the company
instead of the price of the stock, you’ll be able to do another thing that’s “simple,
but not easy.”
We aren’t geared to work BEFORE we buy, and we aren’t geared
to be punished AFTER we buy.
And if we do these things – if we try to “Be Buffett”, then
we can “Beat Buffett” – not by winning any money from him (he doesn’t sell,
remember?), but rather by NOT losing any more money to him than we already
have, and by NOT falling prey to Buffett’s “business partner” (the tax man) who
wants to suppress our ability to compete.
In the next few posts, I’ll talk a bit more about some
specific fundamentals, and the only real ratio we need to focus on.
But this is enough for now…
Tim
XLU seems still stronger than XLI since the March 8 switch, can you add the XLU performance for comparison on the tracking portfolio printout?
ReplyDeleteBy the way, what prices/dates are you using for 1.86% return for XLI? March 22 close was $41.62, March 8 close was $41.82, which is -0.48%
Good catch.
ReplyDeleteThe model actually had some whipsaws from 2/25 through 3/6.
It SHOULD only be up about .97% from the 3/6 (latest) entry, but I missed one of the whipsaws and picked up a partial % by accident.
But that's not very trackable, so I should just put in the gain from the 3/6 end of day entry point. I'll fix that on the reporting.
That would make everything consistent, since that's how I already track the stocks on the full model.
Thanks, Tim, didn't realize the switch was actually March 6 since it was reported EOD Friday March 8 if I'm not mistaken. Also, if you can, it'd be great to see the opposite instrument return displayed for comparison (since the switch date).
ReplyDeleteI'll have to do more "realtime" reporting on the sector model. To be honest, even though I'm running it live in a small account, it's only a benchmark for the full model. If the full model underperforms, then the fundamentals aren't working properly with the technicals.
ReplyDeleteIn any case, the sector model had some whipsawing:
(all of these are end of day)
2/25 XLU -> XLI
2/27 XLI -> XLU
3/1 XLU -> XLI
3/5 XLI -> XLB
3/6 XLB -> XLI
Total returns with the whipsaws is 5.84%.
Total returns if you just stayed in XLU is 5.75%.
I've been planning to just report on the blog at the end of the last trading day of the week to spare people whipsaws that only have marginal advantages. The "loss" shouldn't be that much different from the trading costs a person would save, and he'd only have to peek in around 3:45 each Friday (or today, for this week) to see if there's a change.
I have a friend who asked me to report it that way so he could follow it in his cash account, and it made sense to me.
Since cash accounts have to hold a trade for three days, that works for him.
Since 3/6, XLU is eating XLI alive... that's why I was interested in side by side comparative performance for the currently held segment.
ReplyDeleteSometimes that happens :-)
ReplyDeleteIncidentally, the sector model may flip to XLB before the close. I'll post before 3:50 if it flips.